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Policy Debate 
A major debate within the economics pro-
fession has now been reflected in the finan-
cial press and in policy circles. The debate 
concerns the appropriate role for monetary 
policy and, to a lesser extent, fiscal policy in 
the Reagan economic game plan. A March 
23 Wall Street Journal editorial, entitled 
"Money Doesn't Matter," sets forth one point 
of view with the following propositions: 1) 
the Federal Reserve, through its monetary-
policy tools, can control the money supply 
and thus the inflation rate; 2) the Federal 
government, through its fiscal-po!icy tools 
(tax rates and government spending) can 
affect productivity and employment; 3) mon-
etary policy has little effect on employment 
and growth; 4) fiscal pol icy has I  ittle effect on 
inflation. 
If  these four propositions correctly describe 
the world, then the implementation of mone-
tary and fiscal pol icy wou  Id be rather easy 
and straightforward. Monetary policy should 
be directed towards lowering inflation, be-
cause of its lack of consequences for real 
output. Fiscal policy should be directed to-
wards loweri  ng taxes and government spend-
ing to encourage productivity, because of its 
lack of consequences for inflation. 
Rebirth of classical view 
Some critics have labeled the Journal's ar-
gument as new, radical, and untested. That is 
misleading. Indeed, the Journal's editorial 
simply garbs in modern clothes the classicai 
view of  economics, which dominated the 
economics profession from the time of Adam 
Smith (The Wealth of  Nations, 1776) to the 
time of Lord Keynes (General Theory, 1936). 
This classical economic theory focused 
policy attention on the long run, where 
money was a veil, so that changes in the 
money supply only affected prices. Short-run 
business-cycle problems, in this view, simply 
reflected random economic events, which 
policymakers could not anticipate and thus 
cou  Id not offset. But because private markets 
were efficient and flexible, the economy 
quickly returned to a new equilibrium value 
following any external shock. Policymakers' 
attempts to stabilize the economy in the 
short-run thus would be both unnecessary 
and undesirable. Rather, government policy 
should be directed toward long-run con-
siderations-monetary policy to stabilize 
prices and fiscal policy to encourage 
economic growth. 
The Great Depression of the 1930's-a 
worldwide traumatic event -seemed to 
undermine one of  the major assumptions of 
the classical theory, however. With the un-
employment rate over 10 percent for a dec-
ade, economists could no longer reasonably 
assume that the business cycle was due to 
random shocks which would be self-
correcting by the efficient and flexible re-
sponse of private markets. 
The "Keynesian Revolution" in economic 
thinking arose as a direct response to the 
Great Depression. It shifted the focus of pol-
icy analysis to the short run from the long 
run-"when we are all dead," in Keynes' 
words. It provided a theoretical rationale for 
the failure of private markets to adjust effec-
tively to an outside shock (such as a decl i  ne in 
aggregate demand) and for the need for gov-
ernment "stabilization" policy to offset these 
influences. But although the Keynesian ap-
proach provided a theory for deal i  ng with the 
short-run business cycle, it did not incor-
porate a long-run theory of  either inflation or 
economic growth. (Keynes himself had 
strong, even classical, views on these topics, 
but they were not incorporated into his 
General Theory.) This turned macroeco-
nomic policy on its head. While the classical 
theory focused on the long run and assumed 
away the short run, the Keynesian theory did 
just the reverse. 
In recent years, the classical model has re-
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of the 1970s, which forced policymakers to 
focus more on reducing inflation and less on 
stabilizing income. Because of  the Keynesian 
model's failure to provide a theory of infla-
tion, economists began to return to a classical 
model-in its purest form, a "rational expec-
tations" approach -which did provide such 
a theory. 
This approach in effect asserts that monetary 
policy should be directed in the long run 
towards lowering the inflation rate. It asserts 
also that in the short run, the business cycle is 
largely due to random fluctuations, which 
policy authorities can neither anticipate nor 
do anything systematic to offset. If policy is 
systematic, it can also be anticipated by the 
public, who will actto offset its influence. For 
example, if  the Fed announces as-percent 
faster growth in the money supply in response 
to a rise in unemployment, the public will 
revise its inflation expectations by 5 percent, 
so that there wou  Id be no favorable impact  on 
real growth or unemployment. 
Markets are rational in the sense that they use 
all information available in a systematic way, 
and they are efficient in the sense that they 
respond to external shocks in the least-cost 
way. Thus, there is no role for stabilization 
policy in this rational-expectations world-
the world of  the Wall Street Journal editorial. 
Because of the current importance of  that 
approach, the major propositions stated in 
the Journal editorial deserve further analysis. 
Monetary policy and inflation 
Does monetary policy affect the inflation 
rate? Apparently yes. Monetary policy, mea-
sured by the annual rate of change in the 
money supply, is a good predictor of  the 
inflation rate, with approximately a two-year 
lag (see Chart 1). For example, money-supply 
growth in 1978 was a majorfactor explaining 
the inflation rate in 1980. 
The trends of money and prices over long 
periods of  time are closely related. Low 
money growth was associated with a low 
inflation rate in the pre-1965 period, while 
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high money growth was associated with a 
high inflation rate in the post-1965 period. 
Specifically, the inflation rate averaged about 
one percentage point below the money-
growth rate before 1965, and about one 
percentage point higher in later years. 
Non-monetary factors-such as the upsurge 
in OPEC oil prices-can also affect the infla-
tion rate in the short run. The oil crisis pushed 
the inflation rate above that related to under-
lying monetary factors in 1974 and again in 
1979-80. Weather-caused food shortages 
have caused similar price shocks on several 
other occasions. 
Fiscal policy and inflation 
Does fiscal policy affect inflation? Apparently 
not, at least in any significantly direct way. 
For example, 'an increase in the government 
deficit increases the demand for credit and 
therefore tends to push up interest rates. 
However, it does not necessarily increase the 
demand for goods, and thus does not push up 
the inflation rate. This is because the deficit's 
pressure to raise interest rates tends to "crowd 
out" a roughly equal amount of private 
interest-sensitive spending, so that the total 
demand for goods fails to rise significantly. 
This suggests thatthe deficit, even in the short 
run, will not systematically affectthe inflation 
rate. 
However, fiscal policy and the government 
deficit can affect the inflation rate indirectly, 
through money-supply effects. The rate of 
change in the government deficit is closely 
related in most years to the rate of  change in 
the money supply (see Chart 2). This close 
statistical association is not based on any 
basic behavioral relationship; in fact, the 
relationship is not nearly as close in other 
countries as it is in the United States. 
The close historic relationship between defi-
cits and money in this country reflects a 
number of potential factors: 
•  Even-keel considerations. Until the mid-
1970's, the Federal Reserve tended to hold 
interest rates steady during periods of large Change(%) 
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Treasury financing. The reserves and 
money created during such "even-keel" 
periods may not all have been offset in 
~ubsequent  periods. 
"  Federal Reserve operating procedures. Un-
til October 1979, the Fed controlled the 
money supply via an interest-rate targeting 
procedure. A large deficit could put upward 
pressures on interest rates, which would 
tend to induce monetary accommodation. 
CD  Pol icy coi  ncidence. Government deficits 
were usually associated with business-
cycle recessions, when monetary policy 
was typically eased and the money supply 
increased. 
The one major break in the link between large 
deficits and rapid money growth occurred in 
1975-76, when money growth stabilized in 
the face of  a record increase in the deficit. But 
Administration policymakers expect that ex-
perience to be repeated in the 1981-82 
period. The Federal Reserve is targeting a 
31/2-to-6 percent growth rate in the (M-1 B) 
money supply in 1981-considerably below 
the 1980 rate-and presumably it will target 
even less in subsequent years. On the other 
hand, the Government deficit may remain 
high this year and next, as tax revenue re-
ductions are expected to outpace planned 
spending cuts. 
We might encounter difficulty repeating the 
1975-76 experience in the 1981-82 period. 
The 1975-76 deficit was associated with the 
1974-75 recession -the  most severe since 
the 1930's-which sharply reduced private 
demands for credit. Therefore, financial mar-
kets were able to finance an unusually large 
government deficit with relatively little strain, 
with little pressure on the Fed to monetize 
that deficit. But no one expects a recession of 
1974-75 magnitude over the next year or so, 
which means that financial markets could 
feel considerable strain under the conflicting 
pressures of a high government deficit and a 
slowdown in money-supply targets. 
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Monetary policy and GNP 
Does monetary pol icy affect real output 
(GNP)? Economists generally recognize that 
the growth in real output, in the long run, 
depends on the growth of capital, labor and 
technology, and that fiscal policy can affect 
those variables importantly through govern-
ment taxing and spending decisions. How-
ever, in the short run, the growth in real GNP 
is largely a function of incentives to utilize the 
existing stock of capital and labor. These 
incentives depend upon the level of aggre-
gate demand, which can be influenced by 
monetary policy. 
As we have seen, monetary policy tends to 
affect inflation with a lag. In the meantime, a 
change in the nominal money stock affects 
the real (or inflation adjusted) money stock, 
which tends to change aggregate demand 
with about a two-quarter lag (Chart 3). Many 
other factors are involved, of course, but real 
money and real GNP have maintained a sys-
tematic cyclical relationship over time. 
In summary, economists widely accept the 
long-run relationships between monetary 
policy and inflation, and between fiscal pol-
icy and real output. But it also seems true that 
monetary policy can affect real income in the 
short run. In addition, fiscal policy appears to 
influence the inflation rate, at least indirectly, 
through its impact on the growth of  the 
money supply. 
Policymakers cannot ignore the short-run 
costs involved in the necessary attack of 
monetary policy on inflation. These costs are 
of  two kinds. First, there are the costs in terms 
of pressures on financial markets when tight 
money is associated with large government 
deficits. Second, there are the costs of  tight 
money associated with a decline in real out-
put and a rise in unemployment. Recognizing 
these costs shou Id not paralyze action to fight 
inflation. But being forewarned about costs, 
one can be forearmed to deal with them. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELfTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 










































Dollar  Percent 
6,681  4.8 
6,114  5.2 
1,837  5.3 
5,708  12.5 
- 1,641  - 6.7 
774  107.1 
92  1.4 
475  3.1 
- 2,216  - 4.9 
- 2,553  - 7.7 
4,529  16.7 
12,460  19.8 
12,245  22.5 
6,533  29.1 
Weekended  Comparable 
4/1/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  35 
118  200 
n.a.  165 
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